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KOREA
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2267-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Coal and Cement
Distribution Project in Korea, for which Loan 2267-KO in the amount of
US $ 122.0 million was approved on April 26, 1983. The loan was closed on
December 31, 1988, one year behind schedule.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Division of the Asia Region
(Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II).
Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision
mission of the project in November 1988, and is based, inter alia, on the
Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements, supervision reports,
correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.
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KOREA
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2267-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Obiectives
i. The objectives of the project were twofold: (a) provision of
necessary capacity in rail, ports and inland terminals to efficiently handle
the forecasted coal and cement traffic through the 1980s; and (b) correction
of system inefficiencies in coal and cement distribution which included:
(i) dealing with the complexity of the distribution system due to the frag-
mented coal mining and briquette industries, and the utilization of scale
economies in the transportation of coal imports and; (ii) reversing the habit
of transporting and distributing large proportions of cement il. bags rather
than bulk. (See para. 3.01).
Implementation Experience
ii. After the project was approved by the Bank in April 1983, energy prices
and markets fluctuated widely and the Korean Government took a number of
decisions regarding energy mix and energy imports. This made a review of the
project investments necessary. A mission visited Korea in August 1984 and
reviewed both the port and railway components in light of the new economic
situation. The re-appraisal report was issued on October 15, 1984. (See
paras 3.03 - 3.08.)
iii. After the re-appraisal, implementation of the project progressed
smoothly and by December 31, 1988, all project components w re completed
satisfactorily. There were no cost-over runs, and in fact substantial
procurement savings were realized. Although there was a two-year delay in
the Jung Ang Line ele_.trification and Taebaeg Line signalling system
components, due to reduced traffic forecasts and budgetary constraints, the
resultant impact was a one year delay in completion of these components.
There was also a four month delay in completion of the ports component due
to a labor dispute. However issues here were resolved quickly without
seriously impacting project implementation. As a result of the above delays
the Government of Korea requested, and was granted, a one-year extension to
the loan. (See paras. 4.01 and 4.02)
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Results
iv. The initial intention uf the project, to rationalize the distribution of
coal and cement, increasing those amounts carried by rail, was to a large
extent realized. The development of the Bugok intermodal terminal also proved
to be a major benefit. This facility was originally designed to provide
intermodal services for cement, coal and containers but due to project re-
structuring, coal facilities were dropped and additional container space
provided. As a result the Korean National Railroad (KNR) has become more
active in the shipment of containers in the Seoul Pusan corridor, increasing
its volume from about 600,000 tons in 1982 to in excess of 2.4 million tons in
1988. KNR has already expanded the total area of the terminal and has plans
for an additional expansion in the near future. The Seoul Metropolitan Region
Transport Study, funded under the project, led to the Bank's 1989 Road
Improvement Project. The installation of a state of the art coal terminal at
the Port of Incheon has enabled the Government to lower the end cost of
imported coal through nore efficient handling operations, and the additional
rolling stock purchased will permit KNR to improve distribution and reduce the
cost of its bulk handling operations. The electrification of the Jung Ang
line directly under the project, the Seoul-Kuro and Keumcheong-Sandong lines,
as a result of the project study, and the installation of the CTC on the
Taebaeg line has enabled KNR to increase the capacity of these sections, and
as more of the network becomes electrified, will eniable it to reduce its
capital and maintenance costs by standardizing its locomotive fleet. Finally,
this project has also played a significant role in increasing the operational
efficiency of KNR. (See para. 5.01)
Sustainability
V. The project was successful in that it satisfied all of its objectives and
due to the critical need for increased capacity in the transport sector the
project's achievements are expected to be sustained and even expanded. (See
paras 4.02 and 5.01)
Findings and Lessons Learned
While the project yielded significant results, these were achieved
for the most part in spite of project design, rather than because of it. Some
of the lessons learned include:
i) The complexities of the issues involved went far beyond the
transport of coal. This fact illustrates the importance of
considering the total socio-economic context of a project
during the formulation stage (see paras. 5.02 and 5.03);
ii) In order to be able to do the above, the full support of all
agencies involved is needed, otherwise project design may
take place in a vacuum with obvious serious implications
(see para 5.04);
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iii) Even though the policy environment changed dramatically during
project implementation, flexibility in project design allowed for a
minimum of disruption. What the project nighlighted was the need
for continued close involvement of staff during the implementation
stage (see para. 5.05);
iv) Cost under-runs have become a problem in many Asian countries,
including Korea. Local conditions are seldom taken into considera-
tion to the extent required in cost estimates. As a result of over-
reliance on international prices, appraisal costs are less
reflective of the true situaticn (see para. 5.06);
v) Projects often change somewhat in scope during the formulation and
final design stages. To assess project benefits as accurately as
possible, full economic analyses need to be prepared on all major
components at an advanced stage of project design. To further
facilitate accuracy detailed designs should be -ompleted before
project approval (see para. 5.07);
vi) The impact of disruption to the environment due to the construction
of the coal facility was not fully appreciated during project
design. Popular concern with the quality of life has become an
important component of the Korean psyche (see para 5.08); and,
v) Implementation of regular tariff increases and the introduction of a
cost-based tariff system to enable an organization to recover the
full cost of its operation remains difficult to implement for social
reasons. Experience with this proiect suggests that it may be more
useful to assist an organization to reduce its operating costs and
expand its market as an alternate means to increase profitability
(see para. 5.09).
KOR
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2267-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
T. SUMMARY FROJECT DATA
Project Name : Coal and Cement Distribution
Loan Number : 2267-KO
RVP Unit Asia Loan Amount : US$122.OM
Country Korea Cancelled Amount : US$ 67.97M
Sector Transport Disbursed Amount : US$ 54.03M
Subsectors : Railways and Ports
Approval Date : 4/26/83 Staff Appraisal : April 1982
Effective Date : 9/30/8 3 Re-Appraisal Report : 10/15/84
Comph eon Date: 12/31/88 Total Project Costs : US$479.4M
Appraisal ERR: : 19% Re-Assessed ERR : 13%
II. BACKGROUND AND SECTORAL SETTING
Appraisal Context
2.01 The Coal and Cement Distribution Project was first conceptualized in
late 1977. At that time the proposed project sought to emphasize the need to
rationalize the distribution of coal and cement within Korea. However, due to
frequent changes in personnel in the Ministry of Transport and Communications
(MOTC) and differing government priorities, the proposed project did not,
initially, have strong government support. It was not until the second oil
crisis, in late 1979, when the importation of coal took on new urgency, that
the project actually began to take form. Energy substitution becoming the
catalyst for project formulation.
2.02 Due to Kcrea's limited domestic energy resources, most energy demand
must be met by imports. This was true in 1980 and continues to be true today.
This heavy dependence on imported fuel made energy security one of the most
challenging policy objectives for Korea. The second oil shock provided the
spur to enforce all-out energy conservation measures and oil substitution
through diversification of energy sources. As a result, energy sources such
as bituminous coal, nuclear energy and LNG were seriously introduced into the
energy matrix. Anthracite coal, which ts used primarily to make briquettes
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for household heating and cooking, is mined in Korea, but there are no known
reserves of bituminous coal.
2.03 With the government policy of fuel diversification, which included
substantial increases in coal imports, attention was drawn to the port
receiving facilities and rail transportation system for the distribution of
both arthracite and bituminous coal.
2.04 In reviewing the facilities and systems, a number of issues came ro
the fore: (a) the relatively low proportion of bulk handling, which was
considered more efficient than bagged transport (SAR para. 3.08) in cement
distribution; (b) the transport complexities of domestic coal distribution
resulting from the fragmentation of the mining and briquette-making
industries, where primary flows were concentrated on rail lines connecting
Seoul, Daejon and Daegu (SAR paras. 2.11, 2.12); and (c) the lack of efficient
handling capacity and inadequate transportation systems for imported coal
distribution (para. 2.15). The ports of Incheon, Ulsan, Mogpo and Bugpyeong
were selected to handle imported coal traffic for household and industrial
uses other than those of the steel. mills or large power plants which have
their own ports. New terminals were needed at these ports to handle the
expected coal traffic. Only the terminals at Incheon and Ulsan were included
in this project, the other two ports were to be developed later since they
were less urgent. Rail transport from Incheon Port was to be conducted via
the Suweon-Incheon line. Project planning, forecasting and the preliminary
design of facilities were all based on the assumption of rising oil prices and
continued and escalating importation of coal.
III. THE PROJECT
3.01 Orieinal Proiect Objectives and Components. The original objectives
of the project included: (a) provision of necessary capacity in rail, ports
and inland terminals to efficiently handle the forecasted coal and cement
traffic through the 1980s; and (b) redressing system Ineffictencies in coal
and cement distribution including: (i) for coal, the complexity of the
distribution system due to the fragmented coal mining and briquette
industries, and the utilization of scale economies in the transportation of
ezoal imports and; (ii) for cement, the large proportion of cement still
transported and distributed in bags rather than bulk (SAR para. 4.01).
3.02 Project components originally consisted of:
(a) Investments to increase capacity in specialized intermodal freight
terminals for coal and cement at Bugog and Seongbug; port
infrastructure at Incheon and Ulsan; rail infrastructure on the
Suweon-Incheon (Su-In) line, electrification of 64.8 km of the Jung
Ang line, installation of a Centralized Traffic Control System (CTC)
on 126.8 km of the Taebaeg line and, specialized cars for coal and
cement transport;
(b) measures to address system inefficiencies included policy measures
regarding transport pricing of anthracite and bituminous coal and of
bulk and bagged cement, improvements in train operations and
locomotive utilization, operational improvements at the two project
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ports, and technical assistance and training. A Seoul MY.-roprllitan
Region Transport Study was also approved under the project (SAR
para. 4.02).
3.03 Re-Appraisal. After the project was approved by the Bank in April
1983, energy prices and markets fluctuated widely and the Korean Government
took a number of decisions regarding energy mix and energy imports. This made
a review of the project investments necessary. The mission which visited
Korea in August 1984 reviewed both the port and railway components and
determined that the main differences between the situation at the time of
Board presentation and re-appraisal were as follows:
(a) The rapid build-up of anthracite imports between 1979 and 1981,
combined with rather mild winters, resulted in a sizeable stockpile
(about 5-6 million tons). The Government decision to import LNG to
gradually replace anthracite coal for household heating and cooking
made the importation of large quantities of coal less imperative.
The combination of these factors led the Ministry of Energy and
Resources (MOER) to drastically reduce its forecast for anthracite
imports and eliminate all anthracite imports after 1986.
(b) The stabilization and even slight decrease in oil prices reduced the
pressure for converting industrial boilers from oil to coal. This
resulted in a re-examination, by MOER, of previous forecasts of
bituminous coal import requirements.
3.04 In addition, the Government decided to build e large coal receiving
terminal at Kwang Yang which solidified its position as a coal receiving hub.
From this port, accessible to large coal carriers, coal was to be
redistributed by coastal ships to cities and industrial areas, mostly along
the southern coast and the eastern coast up to Ulsan. Finally, traffic on the
two railway lines serving the domestic mining areas and the cement factories
was growing at a somewhat lower rate than anticipated. The effect of all of
the above on traffic forecasts for imported coal, was significant. The result
was a substantial decrease in projected traffic.
Port Component
3.05 Due to the reduction in coal traffic forecasts, the Government
decided to postpone the Ulsan port component of the project. For Incheon, the
project description given in the Loan Agreement remained valid, except that
the design of the dolphins was slightly modified to make the jetty able to
receive 150,00 DWT ships (lightened to 100,000 tons at Kwang Yang Bay),
instead of 100,000 DWT ships.
Railway Component
3.06 For the railway component of the project, there were four main
differences between the original and the revised plans:
(a) The gauge widening of the Su-In line and the expansion of the Seong-
bug intermodal terminal were postponed beyond the plan period;
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(b) The electrification of the Jung Ang line and the signalling of the
Taebaeg line were postponed by about two years;
(c) The investments in the Bugog internmodal terminal were scaled down by
about 22% by deleting the general cargo area; completion of the
container yard was advanced by one year while completion of the coal
and cement yards was postponed by one year; and
(d) Two new items were included in the project: (i) purchase of
additional freight cars; and (ii) purchase of 20 diesel engines with
mair generators, as replacements for existing locomotives.
Studies
3.07 The Gyeonggi Multimodal Transport Study was an integrated investment
preparation study for road and rail developments around Seoul. The study was
divided in two phases; phase one, financed under the Seventh Railway Project
(Loan 1836-KO), consisted of the preparation of a regional investment program
for the period 1985-91 designed to accommodate rail and road traffic demand in
the area until year 2000. It began in January 1984 and was carried out by
consultants BCEOM/KRIHS under a contract with the Bureau of Public Roads, MOC.
Phase two. financed under the Coal and Cement Distribution Project
(Loan 2267-KO), consisted of a feasibility study of project alternatives with
a view to identify a first Gyeonggi Transport Project planned for Bank
consideration in FY87. Phase two began in December 1984 and was completed in
November 1985.
Project Revisions
3.08 Since the original appraisal, MOF made four requests to amend the
Loan Agreement, two of which were agreed to by the Bank on May 1 and
November 19, 1985. Tne third and fourth requests, were dated January 2, and
July 16, 1986. The final cancellation represented those funds that were not
disbursed under the project. The successive loan amounts which were cancelled
were as follows:
Cancellations New Loan Amount
--- (US$) --- ---- (US$) ----
Original Loan Amount 122,000,000
First Cancellation (05/01/85) 36,762,000 85,238,000
Second Cancellation (11/19/85) 8,997,000 76,241,000
Third Cancellation (01/02/86) 10,758,000 65,483,000
Fourth Cancellation (7/16/86) 11,033,000 54,450,000
Final Cancellation (7/25/89) 421,454 54,028,546
IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
4.01 After the re-appraisal, implementation of the project progressed
smoothly and by December 31, 1988, all project components were completed
satisfactorily. There were no cost-over runs, and in fact substantial
procurement savings were realized. Although there was a two-year delay in the
Jung Ang Line electrification and Taebaeg Line signalling system, this was due
to reduced traffic forecasts and budgetary constraints. There was also a four
month delay in completion of the ports component due to a labor dispute, and a
one year delay in completion of the rail component due to delays in project
start-up. Outstanding issues were, however, resolved quickly without
seriously impacting project implementation. As a result of these delays the
Government of Korea requested, and was granted, a one-year extension to the
loan.
4.02 All investments to increase port and rail line capacities have been
completed. In addition, two specific investment recommendations made under
the study have begun. These include: the Seoul-Kuro line electrification and
double tracking and, installation of a new double line/electrified track on
the Keumcheong-Sadong line. The Seoul-Pyotaek electrified double track
extension is scheduled to begin in 1990. The objective to increase bulk
transport of cement has been achieved, rising in 1988 to about 50% of total
rail cement transport, from approximately 25% in 1981. Substantial
procurement savings, due mainly to Korean contract awards, were also realized.
All project covenants, except for those relating to rail tariffs and the
profitability of Korean National Railroad (KNR) have been complied with (see
paras. 4.04-4.06).
Financial Analysis
4.03 Incheon Coal Port Terminal. It is not presently possible to compare
the actual results of operations with those that were forecast at appraisal
because the terminal did not become operational until late 1988.
4.04 Korean National Railroad. The financial performance of KNR during
the five years 1983-88 represented a dramatic improvement from its performance
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was impressive when compared to that of
other railroads in the world. Throughout this period, KNR was able to
generate an operating ratio, based on revalued assets, of between 94% and 98%.
That ratio, however, improved considerably when only commercial operations
were included, but the rate of return of about 3.3% for commercial services,
during the final years of the project, was still below the levels of 5.5% and
5%, for 1987 and 1988 respectively, as set forth in section 4.07 of the Loan
Agreement. Despite the strong operating performance, KNR's liquidity remained
low and substantially below the levels set forth in section 4.08 of the Loan
Agreement. The reasons for KNR not achieving the targeted levels of
profitability and liquidity are primarily due to its inability to earn a
profit from transporting coal, cement and other bulk commodities and because
the Government is still unwilling to fully compensate KNR for the costs that
it incurs in its non-commercial services.
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4.05 During these five years, annual losses from bulk operations averaged
in excess of U 4.0 million, and the coal operations represented about 70% of
that loss. The project attempted ti3 improve KNR's operating results by
improving some of the bulk operating procedures, introducing a series of
regular real tariff increases, and increasing the compensation provided to KNR
for the losses it incurred from its non-commercial services. The results from
these measures were mixed. The operating improvements proposed in thLe project
were successfully implemented. The major problem with them was that they were
very limited in scope. Subsequent Bank studies of KNR's operations have
proposed more extensive improvements which would, if implemented, have a major
impact on reducing KNR's bulk operating costs. The lesson the Bank has
already learned is to place greater emphasis on helping our borrowers increase
the efficiency of their operations and thereby reduce the overall unit cost.
4.06 With respect to the tariff increases, the project proposed a series
of selective annual increases in passenger and freight tariffs averaging 1%
per year in real terms. In addition, it proposed increases in the freight
rates charged for coal and cement such that the tariffs for each commodity
would, by 1985, cover the full cost of their operations. The project failed
to realize the above tariff increases because the Government stopped all rate
increases in 1985 in an attempt to stabilize domestic prices. Additionally,
the project was also unsuccessful in its attempt to encourage the Government
to fully compensate KNt. for the cost of the non-commercial services that it
provides.
Economic Analysis
4.07 Due to the fact that ultimate use for some of the components is not
yet known, and because the data concerning the improved efficiency of the
system, such as increased capacity, etc. is simply not available, a retro-
spective rate of return for the project has not been calculated. With
potential changes in 'ise of the port component and extension of usefulness of
both of the rail components, it would be more beneficial to consider a re-
examination of benefits at some point in the future, when the proposed changes
will have begun to demonstrate more accurately the usefulness, or benefits,
associated with the components financed under this project. Detailed economic
analysis prepared during project appraisal was conducted for five of the
project components including: Incheon Port and Su-In line; Ulsan Port;
Taebaeg line Signalling; Jung Ang Line Electrification and; Cement Tank Cars.
With the cha.age in project scope at time of re-appraisal two of the above
components, Su-In line and Ulsan Port, were dropped. Furthermore, those
benefits identified for the Taebaeg line signalling component at the time of
appraisal are no longer valid. These included savings in anthracite imports
(curtailed in 1986) and cement traffic diversion (never realized) to the line.
A more detailed discussion of the levels of traffic and the changes that have
taken place in the various project components are set forth below along with a
calculation, where possible, of the ERR for the individual project components.
4.08 Between 1982 and 1988, in the overall railway system there was a 29?
increase in the amount of coal transported and a 38? increase in cement
transported. Within that time-frame, however, the railroad's share of the
domestic freight traffic, both in terms of tons and ton kilometers, declined.
Between the years 1981 and 1985, for ^ xample, there was a 42 drop in the
proportion of coal transported by rail.
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4.09 At the time of appraisal, imports of bituminous coal were expected
to escalate significantly through the Port of Incheon. With the re-assessment
of domestic need these forecasts were decreased. As a result, the 1986
projected traffic (in the SAR) was not realized, falling short of the expected
level by about 132. As well, present 1991 forecasts are estimated to be about
23Z below original SAR projections. Nonetheless, with the completion of the
facility, coal traffic is anticipated to increase from approximately 3.4 mt in
1989 to 4.3 mt by the year 2000. In the SAR the ERR for the coal terminal at
Incheon was combined with the gauge widening of the Su-In line, with a
projected ERR estimated at 22Z. The Su-In line component was not included in
the re-appraised project. The ERR for the Incheon Coal Terminal alone has
been estimated to be about 19Z, but this could change significantly in the
near future depending on whether an additional use for the coal pier is
introduced. Discussions for extending the use of this facility are presently
underway.
4.10 In as far as cement transport is concerned, during 1981-1985 there
was a 21 increase in transport by rail and 62 increase by sea, with rail
remaining as the dominant distributor. In the SAR the estimated ERR for the
purchase of the cement tank cars was 682, and the estimated ERR on completion
of the project is 72X.
4.11 As far as the two project rail components are concerned, rail
traffic on the Jung Ang line has failed significantly to meet SAR
expectations. Passenger and freight traffic are about half that expected in
1986, and even in 1988 fell far below the SAR projection for 1986.
Information on the Jung Ang Line electrification is limited and given the
expected further electrification of an adjoining segnent of the line, which
could significantly impact the lines' usefulness, it is considered to be
premature to assess the benefit of this project segment as it now stands. The
situation on the Taebaeg line is more encouraging, with traffic being about
25% higher than SAR expectations. However since the original benefit streams
are no longer valid (para. 4.07), and there is insufficient quantifiable
inform&tion available at present concerning benefits, an ERR for this
component has not been calculated. It should be noted that in both rail
components, coal traffic has substantially impacted total freight flows. In
the Jung Ang line component it has led to significant decreases in overall
flows and in the Taebaeg Line to significant increases.
V. PROJECT RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Project Results
5.01 The project has provided the economy, Korea Maritime and Port
Administration (KMPA) and KNR with a number of significant benefits, some of
which had been originally envisaged and others not. The initial intention of
the project, to rationalize the distribution of coal and cement, increasing
those amounts carried by rail, was to a large extent realized. The
development of the Bugok intermodal terminal has also proven to be a major
benefit. This facility was originally designed to provide intermodal services
for cement, coal and containers but due to project re-structuring, where coal
facilities were dropped and additional container space provided, KNR has
become more active in the shipment of containers in the Seoul-Pusan corridor,
increasing its container volume on the corridor from about 600,000 tons in
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1982 to in excess of 2.4 million tons in 1988. KNR has already expanded the
total area of the terminal and has plans for an additional expansion in the
near future. The Seoul Metropolitan Region Transport Study, funded under the
project, has resulted in the Bank's 1989 Road Improvement Project with the
Ministry of Construction. The installation of a state of the art coal
terminal at the Port of Incheon has enabled the Government to lower the end
cost of imported coal through more efficient handling operations, and the
additional rolling stock purchased will permit KNR to improve distribution and
reduce the cost of its bulk handling operations. The electrification of the
Jung Ang line directly under the project, the Seoul-Kuro, and Keumcheong-
Sandong lines as a result of the project study, and the installation of the
CTC on the Taeb.eg line has enabled KNR to increase the capacity of these
sections, ane as more of the network becomes electrified, will enable it to
reduce its capital and maintenance costvs by standardizing its locomotive
fleet. Finally, this project has a'lso played a significant role in increasing
the operational efficiency of KNR.
Lessons Learned
5.02 Focus of Key Project Objectives. This was first and foremost a
transport project and as such the focus was on the facilities and systems
necessary to accommodate increased volumes of coal imports, and domestic
production levels of both coal and cement. The ports and railway sub-sectors
were the pivotal points for this activity. As the scope of the project
changed, even before appraisal, the project became a multi-sector, multi-
ministry endeavor, with a number of key elements impacting the movement of
coal and cement and as a result the project itself. Key issues went far
beyond transport. The government energy strategy for fuel consumption by the
residential, commercial, industrial and public sectors as well as existing and
forecast consumption patterns of these sectors both in the metropolitan and
rural areas played a major role. Other significant factors were:
(a) existing and forecast oil prices;
(b) environmental policies associated with the use of coal, in
particular related to populated areas;
(c) the national coal distribution strategy, in particular the role of
the railway sector in that strategy; and
(e) the national coal importation strategy, including transshipment
ports chosen to be focal points for coal importation, and secondary
or feeder ports chosen to handle direct needs.
5.03 The complexities of the issues involved went far beyond the
transport of coal involving, to a great extent, the price of oil. The
transport components of the project became the facilitators for the
government's energy policies. The one lesson most usefully learned is that
the total socio-economic ontext of a project needs to be considered during
project formulation. In this case energy, industrial, and environmental
policies were as important as transport ones.
l
- 9 -
5.04 Government Commitment to Project. This project confirms a lesson
that has already been learned many times; unless a project has the full
support of all of the agencies involved, it is difficult for the project to be
implemented successfully. This proiect was originally conceived by Bank staff
as a means to address a problem that was believed to be pertinent, but due to
various circumstances, it appears that the relevant government agencies did
not completely support the project. The important lesson to remember is that
if the project is to be successful it must have the full support of the
Government.
5.05 Flexibility of Design. The downturn in oil prices and the agreement
with Indonesia to import LNG led to an immediate reaction from the Government
with respect to the volume of both coal importation and production.
Re-examination of the concept of coal hub and feeder ports during the time of
final design for the project por:s also led to an immediate reaction from
KMPA. All of this, coupled with the impact of progressively reduced levels of
coal consumption in the metropolitan areas led to a re-assessment of the
project scope, slightly over one year after project approval. The way in
which the project was designed, with a number of components which were self-
fulfilling on the one hand but intricately related to the whole project, on
the other, allowed for massive changes in the project without negative impact.
Less than six months after loan restructuring and component cancellation, the
project was once again on track. Flexibility for change in the original
design of the project allowed for a smooth conversion. The lesson learned is
that projects need to be designed in such a manner as to allow for maximum
flexibility. This case illustrates the need for continued close involvement
of the staff during implementation.
5.06 Consideration of Local Competition in Project Cost Estimates. Bank
policy is to prepare project cost estimates based on international prices in
cases where ICB is contemplated for use. In Korea, strict adherence to this
policy has resulted in significant cost savings not only in this project
(about $12 m) but also the Seoul-Busan Corridor and a number of other
projects. The same is becoming true in Malaysia and other countries which
have competitive industries. Project cost estimates are meant to reflect
anticipated project costs. Inflated estimates result in large cancellations
and an unnecessary penalty to the borrowing country in terms of overpayment in
commitment charges before the situation is rectified. In the case of
countries such as Korea, and increasingly others in Asia, local conditions
need to be taken into consideration in the procurement process. The lesson
here is that international costs are nct necessarily reflective of project
costs and more attention is necessary, in the case of countries with
competitive industries, to take the local conditions into full consideration.
5.07 Complete Economic Analysis of Proiect Prior to ARnroval. With
forecast increases in coal imports, the Government's original intention of
having international coal ships going directly to the ports of Incheon and
Ulsan was replaced with the plan of receiving larger ships at the ports of
Kwang Yang and Pohang which would serve as coal receiving hubs, from which
feeder vessels would then transport needed coal to the ports of Incheon and
Ulsan. It was found, however, that the Pohang terminal would not accommodate
commercial traffic other than that bound for the Pohang Steel Mill Company
(POSCO). Ulsan, which is near Pohang on the east coast, thus became another
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feeder port for coal originating at Kwang Yang. When the final design for the
coal terminals was completed, however, and a revised economic analysis
prepared, it was determined that a feeder system would not be feasible. With
the subsequent drop in oil prices and re-assessment of coal traffic forecasts
the Ulsan Port component was later dropped from the project altogether. A
detailed project design had been carried out prior to appraisal b- ever it did
not include a review of the revised project conce.t. A final d-sign
incorporating a re-examination of the economic feasibility of the trans-
shipment concept was carried out only after project approval. The results of
the project further support present Bank philosophy which encourages detailed
designs and full economic analyses to be prepared before project approval.
5.08 Consideration of Potential Environmental Impact. Just outside the
boundary of Incheon Port exists a complex of apartments built in 1978-1981,
two years prior to project approval. Although permission to construct the
coal terminal was granted by the National Environmental Planning Agency
(NEPA), which satisfied itself that there would be no adverse environmental
impact, the decision to grant building permission for the coal terminal
appears to have been somewhat shortsighted. The citizens of the complex have
become very vocal in their insistence for improved environmental control of
the terminal. The lesson learned is the importance of appropriate site
selection for environmentally damaging industries, in this case coal. It has
become apparent that the quality of life, as in vast parts of the developed
world, has become an important component of the Korean psyche.
5.09 Limit Emphasis on Cost Based Tariff Svstems. The Bank continues to
support and encourago. governments to implement regular tariff increases and to
introduce a cost based tariff system that enables an organization to recover
the full cost of its operation. The problem with this policy has been in
convincing the governments to implement such a policy in the face of public
demands for cheaper rather than more expensive transportation services. This
project failed to realize the agreed upon tariff increases, and the Bank has
already learned the lesson that although tariff increases may be worthwhile
objectives, they should not be given too much emphasis because of the
difficulty that governments have in actually implementing such increases. The
best way to help an organization increase its profitability and liquidity is
to encourage the development of a marketing program which identifies the
organization's trength and builds upon them. Product areas in which the
organization cannot compete should be phased out. Adjustments in the tariff
rates should support the marketing program and be combined with programs to
reduce unit operating costs through the introduction of improved operating
procedures and greater cost control. If such a program had been implemented
as part of this project, the financial condition of KNR would be stronger
today. KNR, like other railroads in the world, must realize that it can no
longer be all things to all people. It must begin to focus on its markets and
begin to emphasize those in which it has a natural advantage and cease to
operate in those in which it does not. As the nation's railroad, KNR must
continue to provide services that are in the country's interest even though
they may not be commercially viable, but the government should compensate KNR
for the full cost to provide those services and then provide direct subsidies
to those sectors of the economy that need financial assistance.
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VI. SUSTAINABILI_YIREMAINING ISSUES
6.01 Notwithstanding the fact that the scope of the project was altered
significantly with the re-appraisal in 1984 - the backdrop for continuous
growth in coal imports at Incheon port and increasing productivity along the
Taebaeg/Jung Ang Lines is questionable. As a result two issues remain to be
addressed:
National Strategy for Diversified Use Qf Coal Facilities -
ThA Case of Incheon Port
6.02 With significant declines in anthracite coal traffic since 1986, and
gradual decreases in throughput of bituminous coal traffic in a number of
secondary ports, including Incheon, a re-examination of the future of this
coal facility is informally underway.
6. 03 With the recent receipt of a request, from the Korea Oil Company,
for permission to use the coal facility for the unloading of oil tankers,
options for alternate uses of the facility are being considered. The present
proposal calls for oil vessels to use the rear, or opposite side of the pier
which is used by coal carriers. Preliminary investigations, iowever, indicate
that the introduction of an appropriate fender system on that side plus the
installation of an oil receiving facility underneath the pier could be
prohibitively expensive. An alternative option, which investigates the
possibility of using the coal receiving side of the pier is also under
consideration. However, KMPA is dubious that permission would be granted for
use of the coal receiving side as ship priority would have to be given to the
coal carriers, in which case oil tankers could experience exorbitant and
costly waiting times.
6.04 Whether or not an alternative or shared situation becomes necessary
will depend on a number of factors, not the least being oil price variations,
negotiated agreements with the Chinese to import coal, and the Korean energy
strategy. Nonetheless, given present traffic volumes, an examination of
alternate uses for the coal facility at the Port of Incheon along with similar
examinations at other ports facing decreasing coal traffic, would be
advisable. If the coal terminal at Incheon does end up sharing its facility
with oil tankers this would indicate the ultimate in design flexibility, as
the original objective for the coal pier was to relieve Korea of its
dependence on oil.
Alternative Traffic for the Jung Ang Line
6.05 There was a two-year delay in the electrification of the Jung Ang
line. This was due to local budgetary constraints as well as decreases in
forecast coal traffic. Since then, except for the Yeongcheon-Yeongju section
of the line, overall coal traffic on the whole of the e!lectrified section
(project section) has decreased (para. 4.08). The same is true of other
freight as well as passenger traffic. On the other hand, traffic on the
Taebaeg line has outstripped expectations. The anticipated diversion of
traffic from the Taebaeg to the Jung Ang Line has not occurred and, if
anything, there appears to be a reversed diversion to the Taebaeg line. This
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judgement may be somewhat premature as the project sections were completed
only in late December of 1988. Nonetheless, it would not be surprising to see
the trend continue as the domestic coal mining region is located along the
Taebaeg line and, with the installation of a Centralized Traffic Control
System (CTC) system on that line, efficiency is expected to rise
significantly. Furthermore, that section of the Jung Ang line which could act
as a diversionary path presently has two railway systems, diesel and
electrical. The dilemma needs to be resolved as quickly as possible. At the
very least an aggressive marketing strategy should be developed. An
alternative solution, if traffic can be justified, would be to electrify the
connecting portion from the Taebaeg to the Jung Ang line.
VII. CONCLUSION
7.01 While the project yielded significant results as noted in para 5.01,
its broader objective of helping Korea deal with rising costs of imported oil
was affected by the complex and difficult global economy which ensued after
appraisal. The world had recently been rocked by a second oil shock and oil
prices were projected to escalate without reprieve. Korean reaction to the
rising oil prices was no different than in any other country. There were a
number of Bank projects in Asia which sought to alleviate the impact of rising
oil prices. India, Indonesia, China, the Philippines, Nepal and Bangladesh
all had petroleum exploration projects approved in 1982 and 1983, and both the
Philippines and Indonesia sought funding for coal exploration projects in the
same years. 1983 proved to be the pivotal point in energy strategy,
particularly in Korea; oil prices had stabilized and in fact in mid-1983 began
to fall; residential consumption of anthracite was declining and new
construction was being encouraged to use alternate fuels; environmental
policies against coal use in metropolitan areas was in place; the Government
was in the process of negotiating an LNG deal with Indonesia; the feeder
concept for coal transport was under reconsideration; the Government had
decided to curtail the importation of anthracite after 1986 and; a second
steel mill was being planned for construction at Kwang Yang Port, making that
port the undisputed center for coal imports. Hindsight suggests that the
nroject was premature, ready in fact only at the time of re-appraisal, but it
would be foolish to suggest that all factors should have been known. In
retrospect, 1982/83 was perhaps not the opportune time to appraise a project
which focused so strongly on substitutes for oil import, in this case coal.
It would not be surprising to find those energy projects noted as having been
approved during this time frame yielding similar results.
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PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
I. CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE PROJECT
1.01 Due to Korea's limited domestic energy resources, most energy demand
must be met by imports. This heavy dependence on imported fuel has made
energy security one of the most challenging policy objectives for Korea.
1.02 The second oil shock, in early 1979, provided the spur for Korean
energy policy to enforce all-out energy conservation measures and oil
substitution through diversification of energy sources. As a result, new
energy sources such as bituminous coal, nuclear energy and, LNG were
introduced into the energy matrix.
1.03 With this policy of diversification, attention was draim to the port
receiving facilities for both anthracite and bituminous coal as well as the
rail distribution system. Anthracite impcrts had jumped quite suddenly from
0.5 million tons in 1978 to 2.0 million tons in 1980, and no facilities were
available to handle such large quantities, either from a receiving or
distribution perspective. Furthermore, the increased volumes of bituminous
coal, which were carried mainly by rail to the cement plants in the Jechon
area, raised the issue of rail capacity.
1.04 At the same time there were projected increases in the production of
cement due to continued increases in construction activity in both the
industrial and urban sectors. The main issue in cement distribution centered
on the relatively low proportion of bulk versus bagged transportation.
II. THE PROJECT
2.01 The objectives of the project were:
(a) to provide the necessary capacity in rail, ports and inland
terminals to efficiently handle the forecasted coal traffic through
the 1980's, and
(b) to address system inefficiencies in coal and cement distribution.
2.02 The scope of the project included:
(a) specialized intermodal terminals in Bugog, to the south of Seoul and
Seongbug to the northeast, both of which were designed to handle the
projected increases in coal and cement. In Bugog cement silos were
also to be introduced;
(b) new coal receiving piers and coal terminals at both Incheon and
Ulsan;
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(c) widening of the Su-In Line (53.2 km) from narrow to standard gauge
together with the building of a 10 km section to reconnect this line
to Incheon Port; electrification of a 65 km section of the Jung Ang
Line and; installation of a Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) system
on 126.8 km of the Taebaeg Line;
(d) purchase of specialized cars for coal and cement transport.
) policy measures regarding transport pricing of anthracite arid
bituminous coal and of bulk and bagged cement and; an increase in
the proportion of bulk cement transported;
(f) consulting services and personnel training; and
(g) Seoul Metropolitan Region (Cyeonggi-do) Integrated Transport Study.
III. PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS
3.01 ProIlect planning, forecasting and the resultant design of facilities
was based on the premise of rising oil prices and continued importation of
coal from distant corners of the globe, including Canada and Australia.
However, in 1982/83 the retail price of petroleum products began to drop. In
1981 Bunker C, Propane and Butane prices had peaked. In 1982 the same
occurred to Bunker A and B, followed in 1983 by Kerosene and Diesel fuel. At
the same time international crude oil prices were peaking. In mid-1983 the
approximate cost of one barrel of crude was US$35, by the second half of that
year it had dropped dramatically to US$29.
3.02 This drop in oil prices and a parallel decision to use Kwang Yang
Port as the main coal receiving terminal on the south coast and, Pohang Port
on the east coast, with feeder service to Incheon and Ulsan Ports dropped,
dramatically impacted the scope of the project. Coal forecasts were altered
downward to reflect this policy change and it was concluded that a massive
changeover to coal, and subsequent expansion of terminals was unwarranted. As
a result the IBRD loan was restructured and certain components cancelled.
These included construction of the coal pier and coal terminal facility at
Ulsan, widening of the Su-In Line and the construction of the Seongbug
intermodal facility. Furthermore, the electrification of the Jung Ang Line
and introduction of a signalling system on the Taebaeg Line were postponed by
two years.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE
4.01 Co-ordination and co-operation between the IBRD and the executing
agencies, the Korean National Railroad (KNR) and the Korea Maritime and Port
Administration (KMPA), was generally good throughout the project period. The
only problems which surfaced were on the financial side and were considered to
be more irritations than real problems. The first con.erns the Special
Account Facility provided by the IBRD to facilitate fund transfers.
Discrepancies between IBRD notifications and statements from the Korean
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Exchange Bank, and the inconvenience of having the contractor submit invoices
to the executing agency which then forwards these invoices to IBRD, has proven
to be an additional administrative burden and an inconvenient extra step in
the payment system. As a result, in the future the option to utilize the
Special Account Facility would be reconsidered. The second problem which has
arisen is with the IBRD's Currency Pooling System and in particular, again,
discrepancies between IBRD notifications and statements from the Korean
Exchange Bank.
4.02 In light of government policy dec'sions with respect to a decrease
in forecasted levels of both anthracite and bituminous coal, the IBRD proved
to be very understanding of the need for changes in project scope and funding
requirements and, acted quickly in response to the government's request for
restructuring of the loan and cancellation of excess funds.
V. ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
5.01 Overall performance of both KNR and KMPA was good, with project
implementation proceeding more or 1 ss according to schedule. The only
implementation problem arose in conjunction with the Incheon component and
concerned certain incompatibility of detailed civil works and equipment
design. This was due mainly to the fact that the design for civil works was
prepared approximately six years before final detailed equipment design. As a
result the civil designs did not allow for a sufficient quantity of equipment.
Furthermore, specifications had changed since the time of preliminary design.
5.02 The KNR and KMPA components were distinct and separate. As such
there was little need to maintain a constant dialogue. The two organizations,
therefore, pursued implementation of the project separately except at the time
of project restructuring. At that time there was a fair amount of interplay
between the two organizations, in particular as forecasts of decreased volumes
of coal import through Incheon Port directly impacted the Su-In Line component
of the project.
5.03 The Project Co-ordinating Committee, which was chaired by the
Ministry of Transport (MOT), held a number of meetings with both KNR and KMPA.
The meetings were held on an as need basis. Again, during project
restructuring these meetings were held more frequently.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
A. KNR
Jung Ang Line Electrification
6.01 There was a two year delay in the electrification of the Jung Ang
Line. This was due mainly to modification of the ge;irnment's five year plan
and decreases in forecasted coal traffic. In the interim, the coal traffic
has been replaced by other bulk traffic. The decision to postpone
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electrification has proven to be a wise one as traffic volumes have remained
relatively stable throughout the project implementation period and are only
now beginning to escalate.
6.02 Although the project budgeted for the electrification of only a
portion of the Line, KNR believes that further electrification is warranted in
order to allow for necessary traffic diversion from the Taebaeg Line,
relieving a costly transport bottleneck in that Line. Completing only a small
section of the diversion path has not yielded the 'anticipated results. For
this reason KNR is budgeting for an extension of this electrification to cover
the remaining portion.
Taebaeg Line Signalling
6.03 Although it was envisioned that coal transport from the Taebaeg
production area would be split between the Jung Ang and the Taebaeg Line after
project completion, even though the Jung Ang Line is a more circuitous route,
this has not been the case. Instead of splitting between the two lines there
actually appears to have been a diversion of coal. to the Taebaeg Line. On the
other hand, the Jung Ang Line has attracted some of the other freight traffic
previausly hauled by the Taebaeg Line.
6.04 The CTS system has been in place since June of 1988 and is working
very well. The planning and design of the system has been particularly good
and the system especially relevant. Although all training has been completed,
the system is still under warranty. During the remaining warranty period it
is anticipated that any outstanding operational issues will be satisfactorily
addressed.
B. 'MPA
Environmental Impact
6.05 Just outside the port grounds next to the coal terminal is a complex
of apartment buildings. Construction on these apartments was begun a couple
of years before construction on the coal terminal. Through this project it
has become apparent that the selection of an appropriate site for coal
terminals is very important. Although the National Environmental Planning
Authority (NEPA) inspected the Incheon site prior to construction, and
satisfied themselves that the prevailing wind, which is northwest, would carry
the irritating dust particles away from the apartment complex, the decision to
grant building permission for the coal terminal appears to have been somewhat
shortsighted. The citizens of the complex have become very vocal in their
insistence for improved environmental control of the coal terminal.
Programable Logic Control System
6.06 The computer system installed for the coal terminal is a highly
sophisticated system from France. Learning the system has proved to be more
difficult than originally anticipated. To accommodate more training Clansy
extended the training period at their own expense. With the warranty in place
it is anticipated that any unforeseen irregularities in the system will be
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addressed and domestic familiarity with the system completed by the end of the
warranty period.
EGUiDment Facilities
6.07 The unloading capacity of the cool terminal facility at Incheon is
1,000 tons/hr. However, the stacking and reclaiming capacity is less than
that. Although stacking can be done simultaneously with unloading,
reclamation cannot be carried out due to equipment constraints. The original
plan and design calld for two stacking and reclaiming facilities but due to
budgetary constraints, funds for only one facility were provided. This has
proven to be both inconvenient and a less efficient alternative.
VII. REMAINING ISSUES
Environmental Control
7.01 The remaining issue with respect to environmental control at the
coal terminal in Incheon is how best to cope with the existing citizens action
group. There is already a sprinkler system in place and a net around the area
to offset dust particles which emanate from the coal. However the citizens
group is not satisfied with the result. The residents are insisting on the
construction of a secondary fence around their apartment complex to further
address the air and noise pollution problems. At present the coal facility is
operated on a three shift, 24 hour schedule. In the future it may be
necessary to temper this activity. KMPA has been vested with the
responsibility of addressing any environmental concerns raspective the coal
facility at Incheon. As such it is expacted that any additional controls
considered necessary for environmental protection reasons will be implemented.
Augmentation of Coal Reclaiming Eguipment
7.02 The Economic Planning Board (EPB) has been approached for funding of
the additional reclaiming facility. Approval has not as yet been received.
Alternate Uses of the Coal Pier
7.03 Recently a private oil company has presented a request to the
Incheon Port Authority for use of the coal pier facility. At this time
permission has been granted but there is uncertainty as to whether or not oil
tankers can be accommodated at the facility.
7.04 Originally it was proposed that the oil tankers would make use of
the rear, or opposite side of the coal pier, but on closer examination it was
determined thdt the introduction of an appropriate fender system on that side,
plus the irstallation of.an oil receiving facility underneath the pier would
be very expensive. Subsequently, a request has been filed to accommodate oil
tanker berthing on the coal receiving side. This may prove difficult because
although the number of coal ship calls per month can be established well in
advance, the specific arrival dates cannot be set more than a day or more
before ship arrival. This would be true also of the oil tankers. The result
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could be simultaneous arrival of coal ships and oil tankers. As priority
would be given to the coal ship, and the oil vessel would not be free to use
other oil facilities at Incheon, waiting time could be extensive. For this
reason a final decision on an appropriate alternate use of the coal facility
has not as yet been made and will not be done until such time as all relevant
options are explored.
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Table 1
KOREA
PORT FACILMTES IN KWANG YANG V i
Quay-wall Loading A unloading Handling
berthing capacity equipment capacity Completion year
I"port raw Present 50,000 x 1 2,MO0 T/H
materials 6,000 x 2 600 T/H
Bulk terminal 160,000 x 1 2,000/T/H 21,168/year 07/13/87
260,000 x 1
150,000 x 1 10/81/88
Future 260,000 xi 2,000 T/H 09/88-08/90
160,000 x 1 18,607/year 04/90-12/94
100,000 x 1 700 T/H
60,000 x 1
Product export Present 30,000 x 1 30 B.T.C. 11/16/86
terminal 30,000 x 1 86 B.T.C. 03/02/88
80,000 x 1 80 L.L.C. 8,726/yoer 03/02/88
20,000 x 1 80 B.T.C x 2 11/24/88
5,000 x 1 80 L.L.C. x 1 11/24/88
Future 6,000 x 6 86 B.T.C. x 2 1,118/year 07/88-12/90
60,000 x 1 40 B.T.C. x 1 04/90-12/94
Administration Present 8,000 x 2 10/06/88
wharf 1,000 x 1
Total Present 14 18 24,898/year
Future t0 7 14,625/year
Source: KIPA April 19M
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Table 2
KOREA
KNR OPERATING STATISTICS
1982 1983 1984 185 1936 1987 1988
System
Total route (ki) 8,121 8,117 3,117 3,114 3,114 8,130 3,149
Total staff 40,431 39,867 88,656 87,496 37,629 87,195 37,470
Operations staff 34,879 83,588 88,151 88,068 32,922 82,7S4 35,870
other 6,052 6,771 5,406 4,434 4,707 4,441 1,eOO
Traffic
Pausonger-t.tal (million) 443.5 469.4 489.0 608.2 618.9 625 564.2
Metropolitan La 282 815.7 341.9 357.2 874.9 386 422.9
Nonmetropolitan 161.5 168.7 147.1 146.0 144.0 140 141.8
Pass-km-total (million) 21,034 21,688 21,884 22,695 23,662 24,457 26,970
Average Journey (kn) 47.4 46.2 44.8 44.9 46.4 46.6 46.0
Not paying tons (million) 47.4 60.5 65.7 55.8 58.2 59.3 60.7
Not paying ton-km (million) 10,892 11,629 12,083 12,296 12,818 13,061 13,784
Average haul (km) 229.8 230.8 244.1 222.4 220.2 220.3 227.1
Rolling stocks-km for freight
car km (million) 431 463 488 508 627 629 641
Loaded freight ear km (million) Lb 283 281 293 297 317 321 336
Empty freight car km (million) 168 182 196 206 210 208 205
Traffic Density
Pass-km/route km ('0011) 8,740 6,958 7,021 7,220 7,568 7,814 8,247
Freight-net ton-km/route km ('000) 3,490 3,781 3,860 8,949 4,116 4,173 4,377
Operations
Train-km-paseenger ('000) 47,632 48,637 60,181 65,077 66,866 58,675 68,315
Train-km-freight ('000) 21,661 22,839 24,676 25,442 25,742 26,760 27,988
Train-km-total ('000) 69,193 71,477 74,707 78,619 82,697 86,336 86,298
Loco-ki-diesel ('000) /G 81,240 64,184 67,548 68,968 72,184 74,778 76,068
Loco-km-electric ('000) 9,279 9,689 9,969 10,073 10,469 10,424 10,896
Operating Efficiency (freight)
Net-ton-km/train-km 6.61 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.49
Net-ton-km/loaded car-km 41.4 41.4 41.1 41.4 41.8 40.7 41.0
Car turnaround time (days) 4.94 4.76 4.66 4.88 4.09 4.08 3.90
Traffic unite/mployor ('000) 789.6 846.6 879.7 980.6 968.7 1,008.7 1,061.2
Availabilit.1
Diesel locomotives ($) 91.2 89.7 90.2 89.8 88.0 88.7 88.6
Electric locomotives (X) 894 84.4 86.6 86.7 87.7 87.9 88.2
Freight cars (3) 94.2 94.8 95.3 96.4 96.6 96.6 96.4
Passenger cars (X) 92.8 92.7 98.0 94.9 98.8 98.6 94.8
L Seoul suburban traffic.
L Including Caboos.
c Exeluding shunting.
Sourco: It April 1080
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Tabl- 8
Page 1
KOREA
KNR FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC
(Unit: million ton
mUillon ton-km)
1982 19S8 1984 1985 1936 1997 1988
Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-ka Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km
Valor commodiltes
Coal 19.6 4,220 20.1 4,418 28.2 4,797 24.4 6,011 26.7 6,857 26.7 6,088 26.2 5,0f8
Cement 9.6 2,069 11.1 2,866 10.9 2,889 11.2 2,441 11.9 2,616 12.4 2,647 18.1 2,887
Ore 8.9 960 4.1 997 4.8 1,062 4.8 1,082 8.9 968 4.2 1,081 4.6 1,266
Fertillzer 1.6 608 1.6 468 1.6 468 1.6 446 1.6 478 1.8 616 1.8 581
Grain 0.7 216 0.8 256 0.7 282 0.6 201 0.4 189 0.8 84 0.8 98
Subtotal 89.1 8.658 40.8 9.086 48 9.541 46.8 9.870 47.8 10,194 48.1 10.218 49.2 10.790
Others
General corgo 6.8 1,487 6.4 1,678 6.2 1,590 5.7 1,467 5.9 1,479 6.9 1,484 6.9 1,602
Container 0.6 218 0.0 828 0.8 847 0.9 865 1.5 608 2.0 817 2.4 990
Military 1.4 895 1.4 806 1.4 867 1.4 894 1.4 876 1.4 878 1.8 868
KOIR 1.6 171 1.6 178 1.7 189 2.0 210 1.6 156 1.9 169 1.9 149
Subtotal 9.2 2.894 10.2 2.644 10.1 2.492 10.0 2.426 10.4 2.619 11.2 2.848 11.6 2.994
Total 47.4 10.892 50.6 11.629 68.7 12.088 66.8 12.296 68.2 12.818 69.8 18.061 60.7 18.784
Source: KNR April 1989
KOREA
KNR FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC (Unit: million pass.)
millon k
1982 19S3 1984 1995 1988 
1987 198
No. of Pecs. no. of Psee. No. of Pooo. No. of Pace. No. of Pass. No. of Pase. No. of 
Peas.
pae.. No Pom . km pe  p . km pees. km post. km pass. 
km pass. km
Intsrelrt Traffic
Ccnatar 17.0 405 16.8 400 14.6 875 3.5 866 12.8 a87 
11.4 319 10 28m
Long disance 148.8 16,051 136.4 16,838 131.1 16,190 131.2 15,8813 
130.6 16,692 127.4 17,503 130.1 16,529
mliltsry 1.2 332 1.0 B10 1.4 896 1. 
868 1.2 849 1.2 343 1.2 335
Total 181.6 16.88 165.7 18,07D 147.1 16,361 148.0 
16.616 144.0 17.378 140 18.170 141.1 19,152
Long Dlitance Intercity
Treffic bv Type of Service
Special empreas 1.9 641 1.? 607 1.8 689 2.1 Gas 
2.7 893 4.1 1,838 5.8 1,711
A/C Ltd expros 9.7 2,210 10.8 2,686 13.1 3,070 17.0 
8,701 22.9 4,779 27.1 S,6S8 80.0 6,314
Limited expse a8.4 6,984 87.8 7,880 40.7 7,948 42.6 
8,280 43.1 8,268 43.6 3,216 46.2 8,387
Ordinary trains 8a.8 6,216 85.9 4,490 76.4 6,683 69.6 
8,221 61.3 2,767 52.6 2,599 48.8 2,117
Totel 14.8 16.0S 138.4 153683 131.1 165190 181.2 165886 
180.5 16.692 127.4 175603 180.1 18,629
Seoul Urban (SMESRS)
Traffic
Caomuwr 64.8 1,281 78.0 1,426 87.8 1,638 97.7 
1,629 117.9 1,911 121.9 1,923 139.8 2,179
Nioncommter 217.4 8,9" 287.7 4,189 264.8 4,985 269.5 
4,60 267.0 4,271 263.1 4,86I 283.4 ,646 D a
Total 282.0 5jl6 315.7 5.616 841.9 6.923 367.2 6A979 874.9 
6.814 885 S."? 423 6.27 
Surces: KM April 1969
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Table 4A
KOREA
PORT AUTHORITY OF INCHEON
BALANCE SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 31
(million xion)
83 84 85 86 87
Assests and Liabilities Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
Assets
I. Current Assets
Deposit 
- - - 1,111 2,179
Accounts receivable 265 515 560 621 989
Inventories 
- 101 340 155 155
Other current assets 60 105 47 303 444
Total current assets 325 721 947 2,190 3,767
II. Investments and Other Assets 8 9 9 9 9
III. Properties
Land 36,712 39,055 65,091 68,271 68,378
Buildings 6,303 6,553 7,689 11,794 11,784
Structures 39,585 41,830 76,373 84,456 85,314
Machinery and equipment 
- 46 447 7,681 7,668
Vessels 1,230 1,239 1,722 1,820 1,820
Construction in progress and
others 49,164 68,749 62,806 69,036 83,845
Total 132,994 157,472 214,128 243,058 258,809
Less accumulated deprecia-
tion (5,422) (7,091) (2,647) (6,028) (11,447)
Properties - net 127,572 150,381 211,481 237,030 247,362
Total assets 127,905 151,111 212,437 239,229 251,138
IV. Current Liabilities 5,691 759 698 1,794 777
Accounts payable 5,691 759 698 1,794 777
Current maturities of
long-term debt 4,718 968 1,900 1,902 2,215
Temporary deposit _ - - 11
Total current liabilities 10,409 1,727 2,598 3,707 2,993
Long-term debt 50,961 18,564 35,063 41,910 50,434
Total liabilities 61,370 20,291 37,661 45,617 53,427
Headquarters control account 66,535 130,820 174,776 193,612 197,711
Total liabilities equity 127,905 151,111 212,437 239,229 251,138
Sources DMPA April 1989
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Table 4B
KOREA
PORT AUTHORITY OF INCHEON
INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31
(million won)
83 84 85 86 87
Item Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
I. Operating Revenue
Revenue from port tacilities 12,155 12,059 13,673 16,325 18,787
Revenue from equipment 185 30 4 2 -
Rentals - 802 1,027 1,251 2,308
Others 873 770 776 725 1,065
Total 13,661 13,661 15,480 18,303 22,160
II. Costs and Expenses
Employee services 1,644 1,606 1,822 1,801 1,904
Repairs and maintenance 2,579 2,074 696 1,093 1,154
Depreciation 1,260 1,587 2,463 3,337 5,925
General administrtive expenses 457 624 925 1.352 1,887
Total 5,940 5,891 5,906 7,583 10,870
III. Net Operating Income 7,273 7,770 9,574 10,720 11,290
IV. Other Income
Miscellaneous - 1,437 - 199 363
V. Other Expenses
Interest expense 1,148 1,454 2,124 3,411 3,920
Foreign exchange losses 2,966 - 7,914 8,385 8,043
Subsidies for shipping
companies 406 627 857 1,112 1,043
School operating expenses - - - - -
Others 162 30 3 - -
Total 4,682 2,111 10,898 12,908 13,006
VI. Normal Income (Loss) 2,591 7,096 (1,324) (1,989) (1,353)
VII. Special Gain (Loss)
Gain in disposal of properties - - 7 - -
Loss on disposal of properties (9) (57) (98) (111) (51)
VIII. Net Income (Loss) 2,582 7,039 (1,415) (2,100) (1,404)
Source: KMPA April 1989
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ANNEX 1
Cement Traffic*
(a) Rail Traffic for Cement
(Unit: 1,000 ton)
1980 Bag Cement Bulk Cement
1980 5,136 3,012
1981 4,564 2,667
1982 5,081 3,185
1983 6,199 3,431
1984 5,664 3,806
1985 4,994 4,640
1986 4,648 5,601
(b) Cement Freight Tariff System
1. The differential tariff system between bag and bulk cement has not be
implemented. KNR's view of point is that before implementing such a
differential tariff system, the operating ratio of cement freight should be
further improved and silos at stations should be expanded enough to smoothly
handle the increased bulk cement traffic in future.
2. In view of the operating ratio of cement (98.4 in 1986) it will be
difficult at present for KNR to implement the differential tariff system by
lowering the price of bulk cement freight.
3. Therefore, KNR would like to wait for circumstances to be changed
more favorably in view of the operating ratio of cement, silo capacity at
stations, and bulk cement traffic trend.
4. With these in mind KNR has encouraged the customers to install silos
at railway stations.
* December 1/87
- 26 -
I
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT LOAI 2267-KO
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
- 27 - Table LA
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267KO)
............ ...........................................
Appraisal. va Actual Detailed Project Cost
(millon won)
..........................................................................................
-- - Appraisal -- ..... A ctualt .... ActuaL
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total as % of
1983-86 1983-88 Appraisal
............................ .............................................................. 4
RaiLway Investments
..................
ELcstrification, 64 km 11,879 9,046 20,925 15,733 6,369 22,102 105.6%
Signalling, 126.8 km 5,165 11.833 16,998 8,025 4,016 12,041 70.8%
Gauge Widening, 53.2 km 61,656 23,505 85,161 0 0 0 0.0%
Ceinret Tank Cars, 320 2,225 14,103 16,328 39 6,712 6,751 41.3%
Special Coal Cars, 261 1,664 11,301 12,965 33 6,407 6,440 49.7%
Maintenance Equipment 910 4,824 5,734 433 11,811 12,244 213.5%
....... ....... .. ..... I... ..... ... .......... ....... .............. .....................
Subtotal Railways 83,499 74,612 158,111 24,263 35,315 59,578 37.7%
Intermodal Terminal
...........................
Bugog 39,643 19,136 58,779 19,332 562 19,694 33.8%
Seongbus 3,053 994 4,047 3,068 0 3,068 75.8%
....... ....... ... ....... ....... ... ....... ....... ... ....... ................................
Subtotal Terminals 42,696 20,130 62,826 22,400 562 22,962 36.5%
Port CoaL Terminals
..................
Incheon - iviL Works 20,269 20,269 40,538 50,956 0 50,956 125.7%
Equipment 2,172 24,978 27,150 1,463 8,528 9,991 36.8%
. ..... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .. ....
Subtotal Incheon 22,441 45,247 67,688 52,419 8,528 60,947 90.0%
Ulsan - Civil Works 3,247 3,247 6,494 0 0 0 0.0%
Equipment 1,072 12,302 13,374 0 0 0 0.0%
SubtotaL Utsan 4,319 15,549 19,868 0 0 0 0.0%
Subtotal Ports 26,760 60,796 87,556 52,419 8,528 60,947 69.6%
Study
Gyeonggi-do 0 447 447 0 199 199 44.5%
Overseas Training 0 0 0 0 91 91 NA
Subtotal Study 0 447 447 0 289 289 64.7%
Technical Assistance
....................
Port Procurement 73 170 243 197 409 606 249.5%
Port Training 0 43 43 NA
Subtotat TA 73 213 286 197 409 S06 212.0%
....... ....... .. ....... ....... ... ....... ....... ... ....... ................................
Total 153,028 156,198 309,226 99,279 45,103 144,382 46.7%
PhysicaL Contingencies 2,987 2,051 5,038 0 0 0 0.0%
Price Contingencies 20,937 21,739 42,676 0 0 0 0.0%
Baseline Cost Estimate 156,015 158,249 314,264 99,279 45,103 144,382 45.9%
Front-Erd Fee 0 0 0 0 229 229 NA
GRAND TOTAL 176,9f52 179,988 356,940 99,279 45,332 144,611 40.5%
..........................................................................................
Source: SAR, KMPA, and KNR Statistics
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KOREA
Coat and Cc-.-an DiOtribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
................................... ...................................................
Approiset vs ActuwL Detailed Project Cost
(USS Thousand)
.. ............... ............................ ................. I..............................
.------ Appralat ....... ------ Actuat l.. Actuol
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total as X of
1983-86 1983 -98 Appraisat
,... ... .......... . ........................................................................
Roi(uoy Invetstmanes
Electrification, 64 km 15,945 12,142 28,087 19,316 7,398 26,714 95.1%
Signnlling, 126.8 km 6,933 15,883 22,816 9,368 4,686 14,054 61.6%
Gouge WidAning, 53.2 km 82,760 31,550 114,310 0 a 0 0.0%
Cerment Tank Ccrs, 320 2,987 18,930 21,917 46 7,984 8,030 36.6%
Special CoaL Cnrs, 261 2,234 15,169 17,403 40 7,728 7,768 44.6%
linintenance EquipTmnt 1,221 6,475 7,696 502 13,681 14,183 184.3%
Subtotal Railuays 112,080 100,149 212,229 29,272 41,477 70,749 33.3%
....... ...... . ....... ...... . .. .... ...... . .. ..... ..... ....... ..... 
Intermodot Terminal
...........................
Bugog 53,212 25,686 78,898 24,612 678 25,290 32.1%
Soongbug 4,098 1,334 5,432 3,831 0 3,831 70.5%
Subtotal TerminaLs 57,310 27,020 84,330 28,443 678 29,121 34.5%
,....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ............. ...................
Port Coal Terminals
=..................
Incheon -Civil Works 27,207 27,207 54,414 63,468 0 63,468 116.6%
Equiprent 2,917 33,526 36,443 1,895 10,831 12,726 34.9%
Subtotal Incheon 30,124 60,733 90,857 65,363 10,831 76,194 83.9%
....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... .............................
Ulsan - Civit Works 4,358 4,358 8,716 0 0 0 0.0%
Equ;prent 1,437 16,514 17,951 0 0 0 0.0%
Subtotal U'san 5,795 20,8n 26,667 0 0 0 0.0%
....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ....... ... ....... .............................
Subtotal Ports 35,919 81,605 117,524 65,363 10,831 76,194 64.8%
Study
Gyeonggi-do 0 600 600 0 238 238 39.7%
Overseas Training 0 0 0 0 103 103 NA
Subtotal Study 0 600 600 0 341 341 56.8%
....... ....... .. ....... ....... ... ....... ....... .. ....... .............................
Technicat Assistance
Port Procurement 98 228 326 246 497 743 227.9%
Port Trairirn 0 58 58 0 0 0 0.0%
Subtotal TA 98 286 384 246 497 743 193.5%
....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ....... .. ....... ................ ..... ..
'rotot 205,407 209,660 415,067 123,324 53,824 177,148 42.7%
cm ...... =.=aD7= ... aM77B7 .7 ...... = ===== = ===V3==5 =====5===
Physical Contingencies 4,009 2,752 6,761 0 0 0 0.0%
Price Contingencies 28,103 29,180 57,283 0 0 0 0.0%
Boseaine Cost Estimate 209,416 212,412 421,828 123,324 53,824 177,148 42.0%
Front-End 7ee 0 0 0 0 302 302 NA
2=20=222 =2=0==82 22a3228 2=20822 22:7 2===a2 = 28===0= =::=::=
GRAEO TOTAL 237,519 241,592 479,111 123,324 54,127 177,450 37.0%
02002222 202820mm 2202 2 3S 222 7 8 a 02.2228171 2 72022s22
..........................................................................................
Source 'zAR, K#PA, end KNR Statistics
- 29 - Table 2A
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
Loan Disbursements
A. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursemepts
(US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal Actual Actual Actual
Semester Ending Estimate as % of as % of
Estimate Total
December 31, 1983 2.4 0.3 12.5% 0.6%
June 30, 1984 8.6 0.3 3.8% 0.6%
December 31, 1984 17.7 10.8 61.2% 20.1%
June 30, 1985 30.9 23.5 76.2% 43.6%
December 31, 1985 54.5 30.0 55.1% 55.5%
June 30, 1986 74.6 30.9 41.4% 57.2%
December 31, 1986 98.2 30.9 31.5% 57.2%
June 30, 1987 114.1 46.2 40.5% 85.4%
December 31, 1987 122.0 50.9 41.7% 94.2%
June 30, 1988 52.4 43.0% 97.0%
0.0%
December 31, 1988 54.0 44.3% 100.0%
June 30, 1989 54.0 44.3% 100.0%
NOTE: The last disbursement was made on July 25, 1989 and the
undisbursed balance of US$ 421,454 was cancelled effective
July 25, 1989 and the loan account closed.
- 30 - Table 2B
KORPA
Coat and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
...................................................
Loan Disbursements
B. Loan Distribution by Category
(USS equivalent)
.............................. ................................................... ............... I...............................................
Appraisa; Actual
Category ...............-.. I ...........
Laan % To Be X of Loan X of
Allocation Financed Loon Disbursed Loan
...................................... ........................................................... .. . .... ...... . .... .................................
Equipment & Materials for 75,064,000 100X of 61.5X 41,684,428 77.2Z
Part A of the Project foreign
and 100G
of local
(ex fact)
RaiLs, Timber and Cranes 8,191,000 100l of 6.7X 677,841 1.3X
for Part S (i) of the foreign
Project and 100X
of local
(ex-fact)
Coal Handling Equipment 23,219,000 100l of 19.0X 10,627,381 19.7X
for Parts C (iv) foreign
of the Project and 1001
of local
(ex-fact)
Studies for the Part E of 600,000 100l 0.5X 439,397 .8X
the Project
Technical Assistance and 286,000 100l 0.2X 342,337 .6X
Overseas Training for Part
F of the Project
Front-End Fee 304,239 Amount 0.2X 304,239 .5X
due
under
Section
2.05 of
Loan
Agreement
Net Foreign Exchange (47,077) (.1X)
Fluctuations from
Special Accounts
Unallocated 14,335,761 11.8X 0
T. 1 0 .......... ....... .......... .......
Total 122,000,000 100.0X 54,028,547 100.0X
....................................................................................................................................................................................... . ... .. . .
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (2267-KO)
List of Equipment Procured
(Unit: Thousand S)
Wumber of Units Contract Period Cost
- - - - -- - - - - - - --- 
- - - - - - - ... .... .. ....... .. .
Origin Revised Actual Contractor Date of Date of Original Revised Actual kemarks
Contract Expiry
1. Equipment
a. Equipment for Electrification Goldstar Instrument 06/19/86 11/24/87 9,093 7,874 7,393
of Jung-ang Line (64km) and 16 cornpanies
b. Equipment for Sinalling Histui & Co. Ltd. and 07/11/85 10/10/87 12,083 4,625 4,686 Maintenance fee of 14,680,000
to Taebeeg Line (126.8km) Nissin Etectric Co. wilt be withdrawn at the end of
J"ai 1989.
c. Cement Tank Cars 320ea 222ea 241 ea Ssang-Yong Corp. and 07/09/81 05/04/87 18,925 7,891 7,784
Samsung Co., Ltd.
d. Gondola cars 261ea 261ea 26lea Samsung Co., Ltd. 11/22/84 07/29/85 15,164 7,?28 7,728
e. Equioment for Brodeing
Su-In Line
- Rails 50kg/s 9,700ton --- --- 5,969 --- --- Cancelled
- Timber Ties 160,900ea -- 7- --- 080 -- --- Cancelled
- Signalling 530 --- --- Cancelled
StITOTAL 13,579 --- --
f. Maintenance 62ea 78ea 78ea Daedong Coirsercial 07/11/84 06/10/87 6,220 12,422 13,681
Industry Co., Ltd.
S. Equipment for 0ugog Terminal and 3 companies
- Rails, 50kg/m 4,200ton --- --- 2,613 --- --- Cancelted
- liTmber Ties 100,000ea --- 4,359 --- --- Cancetled
- Transtainer cranes 2 ea 2 ea 1 ea Korea Heavy Industries 06/08/84 06/25/85 1,219 678 678
and Construction Co.
TOTAL EQUIPMENT 83,225 42,353 42,155
11. Contingencies
Physical contingencies 1,731 --- ---
Price contingencies 12,605 -.. .-
III. Studies and Training
Kyonggi Region Multimodat Becom (France) 12/24/84 12/06/85 --- 750 103
Transport Feasibility Study KRISH, KECC, YOOSNIN
-raining (Korea)
--- 238 238
IV. Front-End Fee --- 244 244 1,
ito
TOTAL 97,591 42,985 42,740 tc-
in
KOREA
COAL A11D CEMENT DISTRIWTION PROJECT (LOAU 2267-KO)
Koreen Na'ional Raitrod (UKR)
SuISrized Incom Statements and Balance Sheets
(won bilLion)
........... ........ ..................... 
.............................................................................. 
.............. 
........................... 
...... ....... 
.. ... .. ......... 
.. ..
1982 1983 1984 1965 1986 1987
.... 
.... 
.... 
.... 
.... 
......
Actual Forecst Actuat Forecast Actuel Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actu t forecst 
Actual Forecast
IaCOU STATEENT
Gross Operating Revenue 417.3 404.6 470.9 471.0 514.0 546.2 551.2 614.4 592.2 684.8 
626.2 709.6 672.2 662.8
Working expense 362.1 357.5 417.9 379.3 440.7 410.7 459.6 445.6 479.1 479.7 
508.9 515.6 559.3 564.4
Depreciation 51.0 46.2 (58.0) 51.0 65.0 56.7 70.9 63.1 84.0 70.4 84.5 75.0 
88.9 81.0
Net Operating Revenue (1S.8) 0.9 (5.0) 40.7 6.3 78.6 20.7 105.7 29.1 134.7 32.8 179.0 
24.0 212.4
..... ...................   . 
.......... 
----- 
------. 
------ 
...... 
...... ........ 
. ......... 
----- 
...... 
---- 
...... .
------ 
. ....... 
-----
Net non-operating revenue 10.9 3.0 5.9 3.0 4.8 3.1 19.5 3.2 0.9 3.3 
9.7 3.5 9.4 4.0
Interest charges 69.9 80.6 72.5 92.0 80.4 104.1 63.3 117.0 66.8 125.5 
71.2 136.9 70.7 156.7
Net Profit (Loss) (74.8) (76.0) (71.6) 54.3 (67.3) 22.2 23.1 8.1 36.8 12.5 28.7 45.6 37.3 
59.7
.. .. 
. . -- 
- - -- 
- - -
. . .. 
. . .. 
.. . .
...... 
-- -- 
.... .
-- -- 
-- -- 
-- -- 
.. ..
Ratios (M)
Working 91.6 88.0 88.7 81.0 85.7 75.0 83.4 73.0 80.9 68.0 
81.3 67.0 83.2 66.0
Operating 103.8 100.0 101.1 91.0 98.4 86.0 96.2 83.0 95.1 
80.0 94.8 77.0 96.4 75.0
MLAUM SHEET
Assets
Working capital (64.0) (92.6) (56.8) (08.1) (88.0) (81.1) 123.4 9.1 (123.6) 0.0 (188.2) (45.9) 
(196.8) (94.7)
Met fixed assets 2,197.4 2,105.4 2,402.6 2,318.6 2,490.1 2,553.3 (2,839.2)(2,814.1) 3,042.2 3,097.5 3,250.4 3,390.4 3429.0 
3721.3
Other assets 67.9 70.1 64.2 70.1 36.5 70.1 119.8 70.1 162.5 70.1 
226.0 75.1 171.9 77.0
Totat Assets 2,201.3 2,082.9 2.410.0 2,300.6 2,438.6 2.542.3 2,835.6 2,875.1 3,081.1 3,167.6 
3,288.2 3,511.0 3402.1 3893.0
Liabilities
Long-term debt 842.1 844.4 S26.3 988.8 919.7 1,084.5 1,042.4 1,220.3 1,166.0 1,308.0 
1,270.3 1,463.8 1268.3 1620.9
Equity equivatent
1,359.2 1,238.5 1,483.? 1,311.8 1,520.9 457.8 1,793.2 1,004.4 1,915.1 1,859.6 2,017.9 2,047.5 
2133.8 2272.1 W
Total liabitities 2,201.3 2,082.9 2,410.0 2,300.6 2,438.6 2,542.3 2,835.6 2,875.1 3,081.1 3,167.6 
3,288.2 3,511.3 3402.1 3893.0
Source: KNR Statistics
KOREA
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2267-KO)
Korean Nationat Railroad (KNR)
Sources and Applications of Funds 1982-1987
(won billion)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast ActuaLt Frecest Actual Forecast
Sources
Gross operating revevue 417.3 404.6 470.92 471.0 514.00 546.2 551.02 614.4 592.02 684.8 626.02 769.6
Worklng expenses 381.8 357.5 417.65 379.3 439.42 410.7 456.21 445.6 464.27 479.7 497.56 515.6
Cash generated from operations 35.5 47.1 53.27 91.7. 74.58 135.5 94.99 ¶6S.8 127.93 205.1 128.64 254.0
Borrowing -- A _ _ _ _ ._ _ _, ,,, _
Local 143.6 144.0 101.23 160.0 98.09 100.0 116.09 150.0 118.06 100.0 99.00 150.0
Foreign 25.9 34.0 19.52 24.2 8.23 34.7 16.63 83.2 18.83 85.3 24.97 68.0
Total 169.50 178.0 120.75 184.2 107.13 134.7 133.53 233.2 137.43 185.3 123.97 218.0
........................  ----- ....... ...... ........ ..... ......... ..... . .. ...... ----- ...... ----
Subsidies
Against investents 18.0 18.0 27.05 27.5 - 40.0 34.20 70.0 22.0 60.0 25.0 60.0 w
Ainst operating losses 34.8 34.8 35.40 35.4 55.50 65.0 12.80 65.0 30.0 50.0 25.0 -
Total 52.8 S2.8 62.09 62.9 55.05 105.0 47.00 135.0 52.0 110.0 50.0 60.0
~~~~~~~~~~~..... ..... .... ..... . .... . ..... . ...... ... ----- ----- . .------ ..... ........_..... ..............
Provision for severence pay 4.09 3.0 3.17 3.0 2.87 3.5 3.40 3.5 2.14 4.0 2.77 4.5
Other non-operating revemne 11.04 3.0 6.34 3.0 4.51 3.1 19.55 3.2 0.96 3.3 9.81 3.5
Sale of assets 11.07 2.0 21.34 3.0 29.55 3.0 21.68 4.0 9.37 4.4 13.88 S.0
Totat Sources 285.00 285.9 267.77 347.8 274.14 384.8 320.10 547.7 329.7l 512.1 329.01 S4S.0
Applications
............
Invweetents 155.90 176.1 144.19 208.5 124.69 231.2 208.53 257.8 192.21 275.9 243.44 300.0
Debt Service
Interest 69.90 80.6 72.46 92.0 80.45 104.1 63.35 117.0 66.83 125.5 71.24 136.9
Repsint of principal 42.40 40.9 42.88 42.8 100.14 42.5 83.68 100.9 71.06 101.6 78.74 62.2
Total Debt Service 112.30 121.5 115.34 134.8 180.5 146.6 147.03 217.9 137.89 227.1 149.98 199.1
---. .. ... ----- ...... .... ...... ...... ....... ...... ...... ........ ..... ...... .......... _ 
Total Applications 268.20 297.6 260.62 343.3 305.28 377.8 355.56 475.7 330.10 503.0 393.42 499.1
O333 x"= n33303 333 303330 33333 3333 Z3333 U3333 s330-3s 333333 #33 33333 33W
Amuat variation in working capital 16.80 (11.7) 7.15 4.5 (31.14) 7.0 (35.45) 72.0 ( 0.32) 9.1 (64.41) 45.9
Working capital brought forward (80.80) (80.9) (64.00) (92.6) (56.84) (88.1) (87.98) (81.1) (123.43) (9.1) (123.75) -
Working capital at the end of year (64.00) (92.6) (56.84) (88.1) (87.98) (81.1) (123.43) (9.1) (123.75) - (188.16) 45.9
......... . ..................................................................................................................... . .
Source: KNR Statistfcs
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
Teeboeg Line - Actual Freight and Passenger Traffic
(Traffic in the East-West Direction Only)
SAR Est. ------- Forecast -------
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992
Jecheon-Ssangyong Freight (million tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 7.0 6.8 7.3 10.7 11.6 7.9 12.8 11.8 12.1 12.5 12.8 13.2
Cement Ssangyong 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 3.9 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
Cement from East Coast 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
Ore 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8
Others 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
..- ... . ---- --- -- - - - .... . --- --- --- ---- ----..
Total 11.5 11.0 12.1 16.2 17.5 14.4 18.6 17.9 18.9 19.7 20.6 21.5
Passengers (million) 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Ssangyong-Yeongwol Freight (mitlion tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 7.0 6.9 7.3 10.7 11.6 7.9 12.8 11.8 12.1 12.4 12.8 15.3
Cement from East Coast 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
Ore 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 I
...---. ...... ---- ----. .... ----. ---- .... .. . _ . w
Total 8.2 8.1 9.1 13.1 14.2 9.6 15.4 14.7 15.4 16.0 16.7 17.5
Passengers (million) 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Yeogwtol-Jeungsan Freight (million tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 7.3 7.1 7.4 10.9 11.7 8.2 12.8 12.2 12.4 12.8 13.2 13.6
Cement from East Coast 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.3
Ore 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
.... --- ---- .... ---- --- ----. .... - - .... --- ---
Total 8.5 8.2 9.0 13.0 14.0 9.9 15.2 14.7 15.2 15.8 16.5 17.2
Passengers (million) 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Jeungsan-Baegsan Freight (million tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 5.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10.2 6.3 i1.4 10.9 11.2 11.7 12.2 12.8
Cement from East Coast 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.9
.... .... . ---- .... ---- --- ... . --- --- ---- ---- .....
Total 6.5 6.7 7.7 11.3 12.2 7.6 13.5 13.1 13.6 14.2 14.9 15.7
Passergers (million) 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
....................... P
SOURCE: KNR Statistics D
KOREA
Coat and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-ltO)
Jung-Ang Line A ctual Freight and Passenger Traffic
SAR
Forecast ------ Forecast ------
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Jecheon-Dodam (Dodam-Jecheon direction only) 17.4 km
Freight (milkion tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 2.4 2.9 2.6 0.4 0.4 2.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Cement 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.7 3.2 5.2 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.9 5.4
Oil 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Others 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7
Total 5.9 6.8 7.2 4.6 5.0 10.6 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.4 7.1 7.6
Passengers (million) 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 3.1 1.6 1.B 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
Dodam-Yeongju (Yeongju-Dodam direction only) 46.7 km
Freight (million tons p.a.) -
Coal daoestic 2.6 3.1 3.0 0.7 0.8 3.1 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0
Oil 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Others 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0
---- ---- 
-
-- 
---- 
.. . -
-
- -- 
- -
. .. --- 
.... ....
Total 5.9 5.0 5.0 2.8 2.7 6.4 3.1 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.5
Passengers (million) 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 3.1 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8
Teongcheon-Yeongju (Yeongcheon-Yeongju direction only)
Freight (million tons p.a.)
Coal domestic 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
Cement 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4
Ore 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
Others 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 7.1 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.1
Passengers (million) 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8
Note: The 1986 SAR forecast figure of Coal domestic includes 0.3 and 0.6 million tons per arutum for Jecheon-Dodan anrtd
Dodwn-Yeongju, respectively.
SOURCE: KNR Statistics
0r
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KOREA
COAL AND CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 22O7-IO)
FORECAST COAL IMORTS TfWO INCON
(jODO TONS)
YEAR TOTAL ANTHRASITE 9IT1JINUS
COAL COAL
1986 e 3,108 1,670 1,638
1991 e 4,6494 1,570 3,024
1988 3,'78 1,766 1,412
1989 3,471 1,678 1,793
1990 3,484 1,694 1,890
1991 3,610 1,614 1,996
1996 3,931 1,430 2,600
2000 4,311 1,093 3,219
SOURCE: KMPA
e SAR Projections
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KOREA
COAL ANI CEMENT DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2267-KO)
STUDIES
STUDY PURPOSE AT APPRAISAL STATUS 1?ACT
Seoul .'etropolitan The study is aimed to Study began on The otudy roconuiiondod
Region assess multimodal 12/24/84 and was the oloctrification
(Cyeonggi do) transport requirements completed on 12/08/85. and douLlo tracking of
Integrated Transport (rail, roads, porte, The study was throo spocific
Study airports) in the Seoul conducted by BECOM coctiona:
Region and conduct (France), and KRISHS,
feasibility atudies of KECC, and Yooshim 1) Sooul-Kuro
selected capacity (Korea). (11.7.m.)
increase investments. Construction nas
The study estimated to bogun in 1987 and
cost USS1.6 million, is oxpactod to bo
was to be ;unded complotod in 1992
entirely under the at D cost of
Seventh Railway 128.9 8 von.
Project
(Loan 183e-KO); but et 2) Koumchoong-Sadong
the request of the (66.6km.)
government US$0.6 Construction in to
million of this amount bogin in 1990 with
was made available complotion in 1998
undor Loa'i 2267-KO. at an ontimatod
cost of
294.7 8 non.
3) Sooul-Pyoong Took
(16.7km.)
Construction bogan
in 1978 ond is duo
to bo complotod in
1992 at a coat of
247.0 8 non.
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Page 1
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Proiect (Loan 2267-KO)
CoMpliance With LoanCo_venants
Section Activity Remarks
3.02 (a) In order to carry out Parts A ar.d Complied with.
B (i) of the Project, the Borrower Onlending agreement
to relend to KNR, under the KNR was signed August 12,
Subsidiary Loan Agreement, 1983.
US$97,590,761 at conditions
identical to the Bank's loan to
Government.
3.03 (a) The Borrower to cause KMPA, in Complied with.
addition to and in parallel with
its own administrative procedures,
to prepare and submit to MOT and
EPB its proposed budgets in
commercial form and to maintain
its records and accounts in
accordance with commercial
accounting procedures and
practices satisfactory to the
Bank.
3.04 (a) In order to carry out Parts C Complied with. On
(iv), D (iv) and F of the Project, lending agreement was
the Borrower to relend to KMPA, signed August 13,
under an agreement to be entered 1983.
into between the Borrower and
KKPA, US$23,600,000 at conditions
identical to the Bank's loan to
the Government.
3.04 (d) By January 1, 1986, the Borrower Complied with.
to cause KMPA to undertake to
repay to the Borrower; (i) the
proceeds of the Loan made directly
to the Borrower under the First
Loan Agreement; and (ii) the
proceeds of the Loan made
available to KMPA under Section
3.04 (a) of the Second Loan
Agreement, such repayment to be
made pursuant to arrangements
satisfactory to the Bank, under
- 39 - Table 10
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terms and conditions approved by
the Bank. including interest at
rates identical to those specified
in Section 2.06 of the First Loan
Agreement, to those specified in
Section 2.06 of the Second Loan
Agreement, respectively, and
payment and grace periods
identical to those specified in
the Amortization Schedule of the
First Loar. Agreement and to those
specified in the Amortization
Schedule of the Second Loan
Agreement, respectively.
3.05 The Borrower to maintain the Generelly complied
Project Coordination Committee with. Committee met
established within MOT on March occasionally to advis.
12, 1982 under the Chairmanship of on issues which could
the Director General of the not be resolved by its
Transport Coordination Bureau of Chairman or by the
MOT and shall include as members Project Administrator.
representatives of MOT, MOF, EPB,
MCI, MOER, KNR and KMPA. Such
committee to meet regularly at
least once every three months to
advise on the execution of the
Project.
3.06 The Borrower to (a) maintain the Complied with.
position of Project Administrator;
(b) in such position hire an
officer whose qualification or
experience and terms of reference
are satisfactory to the Bank; and
(c) not later than thirty days
after the Effective Date, appo4nt
an officer in service responsible
for assisting the Project
Administrator in his day-to-day
activities under the Project.
3.07 (a), The Borrower to furnish to the Complied with.
(b) & (c) Bank, thirty days from the
Effective Date, a) a timetable for
carrying out Part B (iii) of the
Project; b) cause KNR to furnish a
timetable for carrying out Parts A
(iii), B (i) and (ii) of the
Project; and c) cause KMPA to
furnish a timetable for carrying
out Parts C and D ,f 'rI
and the'n cbUse t )
Parts as approved by the banlK
- 40 - Table 10
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3.08 The Borrower to cause KMPA to Complied with.
employ, not later than June 30,
1983, consultants'to carry out
Part F (i) of the Project.
3.09 (d) The Borrower to prepare Project The Bank mission of
Completion Report six months after April/May 1989
the Closing Date and furnish discussed the PCR
report to the Bank. input with the
agencies and prepared
draft for the
Government's review
and comments.
3.13 (b) The Borrower to take or cause to Complied with.
be taken all such action to
acquire (i) not later than July 1,
1986, all such land and rights in
carrying out Part A (iii) of the
Project, and (ii) not later than
January 1, 1984, the land and
rights in carrying out Part B (ii)
of the Project.
4.02 (c) The Borrower to cause KNR to Complied with but
& (d) maintain records and accounts and frequently several
to have its account and financial months late.
statements for each year audited
and to furnish to the Bank, not
later than six months after the
end of each such year, certified
copies of its financial statement
for each year. (Audit covenant
covering KNR's project accounts
and overall financial statements).
4.02 (e) The Borrower to cause KMPA to Complied with but
maintain project accounts and frequently several
records in accordance with months late.
consistently appropriate
accounting procedures with respect
to Parts C, D and F of the
Project.
4.02 (f) The Borrower to cause KMPA to have Complied with.
its accounts and financial
statements for each year,
beginning with fiscal year 1983,
audited and furnished to the Bank
not later than six months after
the end of each such year.
Table 10
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4.02 (g) The Borrower to cause KNPA, not Complied with.
later than June 30, 1984 to have
its accounts for fiscal years 1979
to 1982 audited and furnish to the
Bank by December l, 1984 the
report of such audit.
4.05 (a) The Borrower to cause KNR to Not complied with. The
establish, by July 1, 1984, or Government has not
such date agreed, and thereafter permitted any tariff
maintain tariffs for the increases since 1985.
transportation of coal to cover Operating ratio has
full direct cost. been in excess of 100
in most years.
4.05 (b) The Borrower to cause KNR to Not complied with.
establish, by January 1, 1985, or The Govenment has not
such other date agreed, and permitted any tariff
thereafter maintain tariffs for increases since 1985.
the transportation of cement to Operating ratio has
fully cover direct costs. been in excess of 100
in most years.
4.06 The Borrower to cause KNR to Not complied with.
establish not later than January Government prohibition
1, 1985 and thereafter maintain on tariff increases a
differential cost based tariffs major reason.
for rail transport of bagged and
bulk cement cargo.
4.07 The Borrower to cause KNR to (a) Not complied with.
cover its operating costs and 4.2% in FY85; 3.9% in
finance its capital expenditures FY86; 3.8% in FY87 and
commencing fiscal year 1983; and 3.5 % in FY88.
(b) earn an annual rate of return
of not less than 2% in 1983, 3.5 %
in 1984; 4% in 1985; 5% in 1986,
5.5% in 1987 and 6% in 1988 and
thereafter.
4.08 The Borrower to cause KNR to Not complied with.
attain by December 31, 1988 a 42% in FY85; 42% in
ratio of current assets to current FY86; 34% in FY87 and
liabilities of not less than 1.5 32% in FY88.
and maintain such ratio
thereafter.
4.09 KNR to not incur any new long-term Generally not complied
debt unless its net revenues for with.
the fiscal year next preceding
such incurrence, or for a later 12
month period ended prior to such
incurrence, whichever amount is
greater, to be not less than 1.1
- 42 - Table 10
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times the maximum debt service
requirements for any succeeding
fiscal year.
4.10 The Borrower to cause KNR to carry Complied with.
out a revalhation of its fixed
assets on an annual basis.
4.11 The Borrower to cause KNR not to Complied with.
make changes in the investment
plan in the aggregate either an
increase or a decrease of more
than Won 50 billion without
concurrence of the Bank.
4.12 The Borrower to cause KMPA to The TOC for Incheon
appoint by January 1, 1986, Coal Terminal was
Terminal Operating Company (TOC) established in
for the operation of Incheon Coal December 1988 and the
Terminal. The TOC to pay annual operation started in
fees to KHPA equal to the January 1989. KMPA
aggregate amount of: (i) the rates imposed outlays of Won
of return to be earned by KMPA; 1,829 million and
(ii) the rental fees equivalent to separate charge for
the annual provision for the use of coal yard.
depreciation of the terminal's
assets; and (iii) the administra-
tive costs incurred by KMPA for
supervising the 13C's operations.
4.13 The Borrower to cause KMPA to earn The terminal did not
in fiscal years 1986 and start operations until
thereafter, an annual rate of 1989.
return of not less than 5% at
Incheon terminal.
KOREA
Coal and Cement Distribution Prolect (Loan 2267-KO)
Related Bank Loans and/or Credits
Loan/Credit Pu'pose Year of Status CoenentsApproval
Railroad Project T o assist in financing a significant part of the Korean National 1962 Coppleted PCR was not
(CR 25-KO) Railroad's (KNR) first Five Year Development Program (1962-66) prepared
through procurement of 115 passenger cars and 800 coat cars and the
services of foreign consultants to assist in the establishment of a
modern accounting and statistical system for the Railroad.
Second Railroad Project To assist in financing the first three years of the Second Five Year 1967 Conpleted PCR was not
(CR 110-KO) Economic Development Plan (1967-71) through construction of new prepared
lines, increased station and line capacity, track and structure
improvements, and the acquisition of motive power and rolling stock.
The credit to finance the import of 600 hopper cars required to meet
an unexpected increase in coal traffic by about 25X and 450 tank
cars to provide for the expected doubtling of the volume of oil
traffic over the project period and consulting services.
Third Railway Project The Project is based on KNR's proposal to expand the 1967-71 1969 Completed PCR issued;
(CR 183/LN 669-KO) investment plan beyond that approved as a basis for Credit 110-KO. PPAR No. 3034
To assist in the financing of the last two years of the KNR's of June 1980.
Development Plan (1967-71). The Goverment's Plan was revised in
1968 to meet the needs brought about by the rapid pace of development
and KNR also revised its investment in transport capacity to meet the
growth in the economy. The project includes motive power and rolling
stock, increase in station and line capacity, track renewals and
improvement in telecommunications.
Fourth Railway Project The Project consists of the first three years of KNR's Investment 197e Completed PCR issued;
(LN 863-KO) Plan (1972-76). To complete the already started electrification of PPAR No. 3742
iodustrial lines conmecting Seoul with the north-eastern part of of December
Korea where coal and cement industries are located; electrification 1981.
of KNR lines in the Seoul suburban areas as part of the rapid transit
project for Seoul Metropolitan area; construction of a new link fromn
the Second Incheon Port to an existing railway line; installation o.o
centralized traffic control in the Seoul area; improvement of ,
mm m
marshatling yards and freight handling facilities; completion of
track and rail renewals; bridge strengthening; procurement of track
maintevnnce arnd renewal equipment; purchase of passenger and freigqt
cars; inprovement of facilities for repair of motive power end
rolling stock; and installation of some telecommunications
facilities.
The project covers the proposats in the 1972-76 Development Progrem 1972 Completed P7. issued;
First Port Project for Pusan and Mukho to meet traffic requirements of these ports up PPPn Po. 5756
(LPd 917-K0) to about 1986 by providing: of June 1985.
In Pusan: (a) a composite pier to handle containers and grain, with
storage silos, appropriate equipment and necessary dredging; (b) a
dry bulk cargo handling pier with integrated bulk-handling systems,
and necessary dredging; (c) international (Korea-Japan) and coastal
ferry terminals; (d) rehabilitation of existing general cargo berths;
and (e) a new military berth to be financed by the government.
In Nukho: (f) improvements to the coal handling piers and the
mechanical loading system; (9) improvements to the existing
breakwater ; (h) minor inprovements to general cargo and cement
berths.
Consutting Services and Technical Assistance: (f) consulting services
for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the
above works; the determination of future development requirements.
Technical Assistance to assist in establishing KPA and on the job
training of personnel.
Fifth Railway Project The project consists of the investments which KNR intends to make 1974 Compteted. PCR issued;
(LN 1101-KO) during the last two years of the Third Plan (1972-76). It consists PPAR No. 3742
of (a) the completion of the electrification of industrial and of December
suburban (Seoul) lines; (b) the completion of centralized traffic 1981.
control in Seoul area; (c) continuation of double-tracking of the Ho
Nam line and partial dou*bling of the Tae Baeg line; td) the
acquisition of 50 diesel and 10 electric locomotives; (e) the
improvement of marshalling yards and bridge strengthening; (f) way
artd structure renewal and improvement; (g) the acquisition of spare
parts for track maintenance equipment and for the maintenance of the
fleet of locomotives and wheel sets for passenger and freight cars;
(h) the purchase of 150 passenger and 2,000 freight cars; (i) plant
and machinery for workshops and running sheds; and (j) technical
assistance to finance the training of KNR staff and the services of
an advisor to assist in the execution of a motive power and rolling
stock maintenance program.
Second Port Project To continue development of Pusan Port being financed under the First 1976 Crmpleted PCR issued; s
(LN 1401-KO) Port Project (Loan 917-KO). The project consists of 1. Civil Works - PPAR No. 5756 7 v
(a) 700 m extension of the conmon user container berths and a 335,000 of June 195. rD
sq. m. expansion of the stacking area provided under that project;
(b) dredging to provide an alongside depth of 12.5 m; (C) an access
road irside the port limits; a guard house and an 8,000 sq. m.
container freight station; (d) ancillary works andutilities; and (e)
rehabi(itation of piers 3 and 4, the central wharf, and a tighter
wharf No. 5. 2. Mechanical Equsipent - Procurement of container
cranes end mobile container hafdling equipsent. 3. Floatinq Craft -
Procurement of two tug boats. 4. Engineering Consultant Services -
to carry out detailed design mnd supervision of construction ard
procurement of the above. And 5. Technical Assistance and Traininor
- to assist in cargo handling (including the handling of containers),
maintenance, port planning, end accourting.
SiAth Railtway Project The Project forms part of KNR's Investment Plan t1977-81), end aims 1977 Coapleted PC2 icsued;
(LI 1542-KO) at (a) providing KNR with the capacity required to meet forecast PCM No. 5090
traffic; and Cb) reducing operating and maintenance costs. It of May 198.
includes continued double tracking and electrification of tines,
extension of yards end terminals, continued installation of
centralized traffic control, track an rail renewal, separation of
road and rait at crossings, installation of a permanent way workshop,
procuremient of diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars,
provision of a new passenger car workshop, installation of additional
telecommnication and power facilities and provision of technical
assisteace to KKR end conducting transport sector studies. The
project will enable the railtays to move increasing quantities of
bulk camodities and passengers on routes for which the railways
remain the most economic mode of transport, thus realizing sizeable
savings in transport costs to the entire economy.
Seventh Railtay Project To increase the capacity of the transport system in the most 1979 Cornleted PCR issued;
CLI 1836-KO) econonically efficient way and to develop and strengthen the PCR No. 6196
institutions dealing with the transport sector. The main component of May l9o6.
of the project is the 1980-81 part of KNR's 1977-81 Investment Plan
which aims at (a) initiating the institutional changes necessary to
gradually transforn KNR into a public corporation; (b) providing K4R
with the capacity required to meet forecast traffic; and (c) reducing
operating and maintenance costs. To f inance rai ls, track maintenance
equipment, breakdown cranes, passenger cars, freight cars, workshop
equipsent, technical assistance and training. The project will
enable KNR to move increasing quantities of bulk cofmodities and
passengers on routes for which the railways remain the most economic
mode of transport, thus realizing sizeable savings in transport costs
to the entire economy.
Seoul -Pusan Corridor The Project forms part of KNR's Managewent loprovement Program for 1985 On-going Expected to ,, ,
(LJ 2600-KO) the devalopment of rail traffic in the Seoul - Pusan Corridor. To c l oe en r' 0
reduce losses incurred f.,r ordinary train services as well as to 12/31/89.
improve other already profitable services offered. The program
cosprises (a) instituticnal and policy reasures aimed mainty at
ensuring KKR's long-term viability of the railways by further
improving services that are most prof I table; (b) measures to improve
inter modal cooplementarity and railway coapetitiveness end to
prepare the grourd for a high speed train, a major capacity Increase
to be introduced in the 90s; and lc) inv^stments in track signalling
to increase capacity and in related rolling stock/equipment in line
with transport demand. The loan would finace over the 19B5-88
period investments under part lc) the resignalling and central
traffic control together with the associated technical assistance and
training, and KNR and Republic of Korea would furid the other
investments.
Pusan Port Project To iqprove capacity by constructing additional specialized container 1985 On-going Expected to
(LN 27 26-Ko) berths at Pusan Port; to reduce congestion in Pusan City by providing c l o s e on
an on-dock storage area to replace storage areas in the city. To 12/31/92.
meet the Government's objective of increasing the efficiency and
reducing the costs of container handling and inland transportation.
To improve management and financiaL control over ports activities end
strengthen port plamning capabilities.
crs
fD
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Table 12 A
Korea
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
Use of Bank Resources
A. Staff Inputs
Stage of Number of Remarks
Project Cycle Staff Weeks
Through Appraisal 136.0 (1)
Appraisal through
Board Approval 29.0 (1)
Board Approval
through Effectiveness 9.O (1)
Supervision 55.0
Project Completion
Report 2.6
Total 231.6
Note: (1) Estimates, as the MIS divides the lending operation
into different categories.
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Table 12 B
Korea Page 1
Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO)
Use of Bank Resources
B. Missions
Stage of Nonth/ llwr Days Special- Performance Rating Types
Project Year of in izatlon Status (2) of
Cycle Persons Field Represented (1) Problema (3)
1. Through Appraisal
Preparation
1 4\77 3 3 FNA\ENG\ECN ---- ----
2 4\78 1 4 ECN ----
3 5\79 4 7 FNA\ENG\ECN\TSP ---- ----
4 9\79 3 3 FNA\ENG\ECN ---- -
5 1\80 3 11 FNA\ENG\ECN ----
6 7\80 3 8 FNA\ECN\ENG ---- -
7 9\80 2 3 FNA\ENG ---- ....
8 3\81 4 14 FNA\ECN\ENG(2) ---- ----
9 6\81 6 14 FNA\ECN\TSP\ENG(3) ---- ----
Pre-appraisal
9\81 2 20 FNA\ENG ---- -
Appraisal
1 4\82 4 14 FNA\ENG(2) ---- ----
2 9\82 4 14 FNA\ECN\ENG(2) ---- ----
2. Appraisal Through Board Approval
7\82 2 7 ECN\ENG ---- -
1\83 1 7 FNA ---- -
3. Supervision
1 10\83 3 7 FNA\ENG(2) 2 P
Re-appraisal
8\84 4 14 FNA\ECN\ENG(2) ---- -
Supervision
2 8\84 4 7 FNA\ECN\ENG(2) 1 ----
.3 7\85 3 10 ENG\ECN(2) S ----
4 11\85 3 1 ECN(3) S ----
5 5\86 1 2 ECN ---- ----
6 11\87 3 4 FNA\ENG(2) 1
7 6\88 2 4 FNA\ENG 1 ----
8 11\88 2 2 FNA\ENG 1 ----
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NOTES: (1) FNA = Financial Analyst, ECN = Economist,
ENG = Engineer, TSP = Transport Specialist
(2) 1 = Problem free or Minor Problems, 2 = Moderate
Problems
(3) P = Policy Change on use of coal
(4) S = Mission only reviewed status of study component
of project
